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7 Economic bases of communication
Abstract: This chapter provides a general introduction to the essential economic
issues of communication, both interpersonal and mediated. It covers economic
concepts and methods relevant to the field. The focus is on mass communication
and media economics, however featured concepts such as network effects and
issues of regulation are also relevant for interpersonal communication. Further-
more it discusses concentration, internationalization, and convergence as three
fundamental developments in media systems that tend to blur clear cut distinc-
tions between media technologies and areas of research.
Keywords: Media markets, good characteristics, media regulation, business
models, value-chain, network effects, media concentration, convergence, interna-
tionalization
Economic considerations related to communication generally focus on mass com-
munication and mass media. Media economics has a long research tradition,
although different periods were dominated by different theoretical approaches. For
example, in Europe, critical political theory approaches dominated the 1970s
through the late 1980s. In the 1990s, though, media economics research started
to use traditional economic and management theories, models, and concepts of
neoclassical and institutional economics. Economic considerations are less com-
mon in the context of interpersonal or group communication. For a long time,
research on telecommunications did not refer to communication science explicitly.
Taking the research history into account, the following article focuses on
media economics but also briefly covers aspects of interpersonal communication.
The article is divided into four sections and starts with a general introduction to
the essential economic issues of communication, both interpersonal and mediated.
Section 2 covers economic concepts and methods relevant to the field. The discus-
sion will focus on mass communication and media economics, although concepts
such as network effects and issues of regulation are also relevant for interpersonal
communication. Section 3 discusses concentration, internationalization, and con-
vergence as three fundamental developments in media systems that tend to blur
clear cut distinctions between media technologies research. Section 4 provides an
overview and outlook to conclude the article.
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1 Fundamental economic challenges in
communication
Interpersonal communication is a precondition of any economic activity. Before
any kind of transaction can take place, individuals must communicate even if they
do so as the representative of a larger corporate body. Information must be avail-
able for markets to be functional (Baumol and Blinder 2006: 195), and more often
than not, it is gathered through interpersonal communication be it face-to-face or
mediated through a carrier medium. Individuals negotiate prices or discuss how a
task is to be carried out. The expectancy-value theory (Fishbein and Ajzen 1975)
addresses the question of how much effort should be made to make a persuasive
message credible. It suggests that the persuasiveness of a suggestion equals the
promised value (or harm) multiplied by the perceived probability of its occurrence.
The Harvard concept (Fisher and Ury 1981) also offers an economic perspective on
interpersonal communication as it tries to make personal negotiations both suc-
cessful and efficient. However, usually interpersonal communication itself is not
the traded matter; only personal counselors or psychologists get paid for the act of
interpersonal communication. Thus, when analyzing communication, economists
usually concentrate on mediated communication, or mass communication.
In modern societies, successful mass communication relies on mass media
systems that meet important socio-political and cultural expectations. Society
expects the media to provide information, to entertain people, to create publicity
for various issues, to criticize, and, to a certain extent, control activities and protag-
onists, in particular those concerning politics and the economy. Some researchers
doubt a commercial media system relying on free markets and market-oriented
media companies can meet these expectations. Instead of quality news coverage
that supports the political debate, society might then have to face “news that’s fit
to sell” (Hamilton 2004) or “market-driven journalism” (McManus 1994). The
debate on the commercialization of the media (Croteau and Hoynes 2001; Gandy
2004; Picard 2004, 2005a; Siegert 2001b, 2003; McQuail 1998; Bagdikian 2000;
Napoli and Gillis 2006) addresses this issue and discusses the consequences of
market considerations becoming ever more important in the daily work of media
organizations. Following the arguments of the commercialization debate tends to
result in media production that does not serve the public interest. However, it is
also discussed whether media brand reputation as an institutional arrangement
could help media markets to better work in respect of the public interest (Siegert
et al. 2008; Siegert et al. 2011).
In addition, the importance of a functioning mass media system is only partly
reflected in the economic size of the industry. The percentage that the media con-
tributes to the gross domestic product (GDP) differs according to the market defini-
tion (see Section 2.2) from 0.21% for broadcast media in Germany in 2009 (ALM
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2010) to 6.0% for copyright-based industries in the United States in 2002 (Siwek
2004: 3). These numbers only represent the economic dimension of the media,
and thus tremendously underestimate the significance of the industry for society.
Luhmann (1996: 9) stated: “What we know about our society, indeed the world in
which we live, we learn from the mass media”. Therefore, any account of the media
as economic good must also pay respect to the importance of the media as a
cultural good that shapes our opinions, influences our values and norms, and
provides us with conversation topics to build social capital. The dual character as
economic and cultural good poses a challenge to regulation (see Section 2.4).1
Both interpersonal and mass communication markets show large externalities
due to network effects (see Section 2.6). Thus, business models in communication
are routinely based on two-sided markets and mixed funding (see Section 2.5).
2 Economic concepts and models
In this section, we will discuss economic concepts and models mainly focusing on
mass communication. However, many of the presented concepts are relevant for
interpersonal communication too, and this will be pointed out where appropriate.
2.1 Media as economic good
Most introductions to media economics mention the unique characteristics of
media goods, which exert major influence on how media markets work and what
kinds of strategies fit in media business (Doyle 2002: 11; Kiefer 2005: 130–160;
Picard 1989: 17–19, 2005b; Heinrich 2010: 25–43).2
Taking ‘packaged and delivered content’ as a starting point, it is discussed
throughout the literature whether media goods are public goods and/or merit
goods and how to handle externalities. These characteristics are sources of the
inefficiency of resource allocation and consequential of market failure (see Sec-
tion 2.4). Public goods are non-excludable (exclusion of potential users is either
1 The difference between media as economic and as cultural good is also important in the
production of media. A special characteristic about media products is the level of dedication and
commitment that the content producers – be it journalists or film directors – show toward their
work. Creative workers care about their product (Caves 2000: 3), and thus value not only the
monetary compensation, but also a creative satisfaction.
2 Most authors refer to the packaged and delivered content as media good. Only a few contri-
butions include access to audiences as marketed service, and almost none consider that the key
characteristics change along the value chain. We like to address this problem simply by
mentioning that on the business-to-business market, where content producers deal with media
distributors, the traded good does not feature most of the listed unique characteristics.
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impractical or impossible), which leads to free rider problems, and are non-rival-
rous (consumption by one person does not lessen the amount available for others),
which makes exclusion inefficient. In particular, free-to-air broadcasting is said to
be a public good.
Putatively, the consumption of media content can have positive external
effects, such as citizens being well-informed and making enlightened choices, as
well as negative external effects, such as citizens exhibiting violent behavior. Both
effects are not included in the price of media content: society either benefits from
it or has to pay for it. Society expects the media to provide content with positive
external effects, but unfortunately this content often does not generate a great
consumer demand. In a normal market relationship, profit-maximizing suppliers
therefore would fail to meet society’s demand for such a service. This does not
mean that merit goods will not be offered in a market with profit-maximizing sup-
pliers, but the socially desirable output level will be higher than the market effi-
cient output level (Demsetz 1970). That makes part of the media content a merit
good.
Furthermore, the media industry is characterized by high first copy costs, econ-
omies of scale, and economies of scope. High first copy costs imply that fixed costs
of media production are high and independent of the amount of copies made,
while variable costs are relatively low. This tends to result in decreasing the average
fixed costs by increasing output (economies of scale). Due to the costs of physical
production and distribution of copies, this effect is stronger in the audiovisual
industry than in the print publishing industry and is most powerful concerning
digital production and distribution. To sum up, large scale production is more
efficient than small-scale production (Picard 1989: 62). Economies of scope “arise
when there are some shared overheads for two or more related products to be
produced and sold jointly, rather than separately. Savings may arise if specialist
inputs gathered for one product can be re-used in another” (Doyle 2002: 13–14).
Additionally, media goods are characterized as experience and credence goods.
Entertainment is regarded as an experience good, or a good with unknown charac-
teristics whose quality and utility can only be judged after being used several times
(Nelson 1970). Journalistic information, however, is regarded as a credence good.
Credence good markets are characterized by asymmetric information between sell-
ers and consumers (Darby and Karni 1973). Users are unable to fully measure the
quality of media content. For example, they cannot judge whether information
provided by a news broadcast meets journalistic quality standards because the
background work, selection, investigation, and effective workload remain ‘invisi-
ble,’ or cannot be accessed for monitoring, and could only be evaluated by com-
pletely repeating the journalistic inquiry. Altogether, media users tend to rely on
external information and market signals such as reputation and brand (Heinrich
and Lobigs 2003; Lobigs 2004; Siegert 2001a, 2006a). Charging users for an experi-
ence good or a credence good is difficult. People might not be willing to pay before
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they can access the good, and if they have experienced it they most likely will not
want to pay for something they already experienced. This renders indirect financ-
ing through advertising an expeditious alternative.
Last but not least, uncertainty in the media production process and copyright
problems are also characteristics that lead to imitation rather than innovation as
a preferred strategy of media companies. The characteristics of media content do
have consequences regarding financing. In the media business, frequently revenue
is not immediately connected to transactions. Readers often pay a subscription fee
for their newspaper; advertisers pay for advertising space and assumed attention
but cannot be sure that anybody will see it. The license fee for public service
broadcasters has to be paid independently from the use of the public channels.
2.2 Defining relevant media markets
Defining the relevant market involves clarifying the market structure and is closely
related to the state of competition. Usually four types of competitive market struc-
ture are differentiated: perfect competition, monopolistic competition, oligopoly,
and monopoly. Following the Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) paradigm,
analyzing the market structure includes at least the number of sellers and buyers,
product differentiation, cost structures, vertical integration, and barriers to entry
for new competitors. The market structure determines the state of competition, the
context for strategies, and the resulting performance of companies (Scherer 1980;
Chan-Olmsted 2006: 163).
It is essential to define the relevant market in order to assess its market power
and the intensity of competition in a (media) market, as well as to align (media)
strategies with the competitive environment. “Defining a market involves specify-
ing the good/service markets involved and combining that description with a spe-
cific geographic market description” (Picard 1989: 17). The generally used ‘relevant
market concept’ is based on the substitutability of goods or services; from the
average consumer’s perspective, (media) products and services can easily replace
one another and compete in the same market.
Throughout the literature on media economics and media management, it is
given that most media companies operate in a dual-product market by participat-
ing in an audience market as well as in an advertising market (see Section 2.3).
However, the different media are not fully interchangeable with one another due
to technological standards, product differences, and usage patterns. Therefore, it
once was assumed that different media technologies (newspaper, magazines, tele-
vision, and radio) do not compete with each other, whereas companies dealing
with the same media do (intramedia competition). Among changing technological
standards, though, consumer tastes and usage patterns have led to increasing
intermedia competition and also challenged the precise definition of the relevant
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market. The topics covered and the corresponding target groups increasingly deter-
mine the boundaries of media markets rather than media technologies.
In addition, it is important to clarify the geographical dimension of media
markets. Due to the interests of audiences, some media firms market their outlets
locally or regionally, yet others sell them nationwide or, in some cases, internation-
ally. Global media outlets are an exception, although the activities of transnational
corporations force competition on an international level (Gershon 2006; Sánchez-
Tabernero 2006). The geographical dimension is only one factor that influences
the size of a media market; it refers partly to the size of the audience that could
be interested in a certain media outlet. However, media outlets are also closely
connected to certain geographical areas for cultural and political reasons. They
relate to a certain political system’s events and actors, to languages, to different
patterns of media usage, and to a common cultural identity. The market size, on
the other hand, is important because of the effectiveness of key economic charac-
teristics of media products (fixed cost degression, economies of scale, partly econo-
mies of scope). The bigger the market in which a media company operates, the
more effective are these characteristics – operating in a big market is a competitive
advantage. Small media markets are a key characteristic of so-called small coun-
tries and therefore foster regulation (see Section 2.4).
2.3 Dual-product market
Some media technologies such as books or recorded music rely almost entirely on
direct sales to recipients. Producers offer one product in one market and the audi-
ence’s interest should be their only benchmark. However, more often than not,
media are financed simultaneously from several different sources. A newspaper
publisher derives revenue from the copy price as well as from advertising sales. A
public broadcaster might add some advertising revenue to its license fee, but a
free-to-air TV channel might rely almost entirely on advertising revenue. In these
cases, media firms operate in a dual-product market (Picard 1989), which means
that media firms produce and market one product – content – in an effort to
simultaneously produce and market a second product – audience attention. Econo-
mists speak of a two-sided market (Rochet and Tirole 2006) where the business
model considers viewers as a loss leader, which in turn attracts advertisers. Success
or failure in the market for audience contacts is a function of success or failure in
the market of content for recipients, and vice versa. A broadcaster or publisher
that fails to attract a reasonably large or demographically desirable audience has
a relatively unappealing product to sell in the advertising market. The same broad-
caster or publisher therefore will not have the financial resources (relative to its
competitors) to produce content capable of attracting a larger or more desirable
audience since prices for readers or viewers are subsidized (Kaiser and Wright
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2006). Thus, the audience and advertising markets are tightly intertwined, even if
all revenue is derived from the advertising market.
This dual-product market would not work, though, without well-established
and accepted commercial audience research (Ang 1991; Siegert 1993: 15; Ettema
and Whitney 1994; Webster et al. 2006; Frey-Vor et al. 2008). Therefore, commercial
audience research is discussed as an indispensible market information system
(Phalen 1998). It measures, segments, and rates the audience of past programs and
provides estimates of the future audience. As a result, it makes the invisible and
sometimes unknown audience visible and marketable to advertisers. Ratings are
one of the most common examples of commercial audience research and have
found their way into popular culture.
2.4 Market failure and regulation
Broadcast media in particular are regarded as a prime example of a public good
(see Section 2.1). The characteristics of public goods lead to market failure because,
if no one can be excluded from the use of a commodity, people will try to get a
free ride and the willingness to pay will converge to zero. If the consumption of a
commodity by one person does not restrict availability for others, the commodity
is not scarce, and thus, again, it is impossible to discriminate using the price
mechanism. In most European countries, legislators introduced public service
media to address market failure, which ensured that consumers pay for the media
via the license fee or taxes while maximizing the public good to society’s benefit
(Graham 1999). Commercial broadcasters address the market failure by bringing in
the advertising industry as a middle man. In this model, the broadcaster actually
does not want to exclude anybody from consumption since the objective is to gen-
erate the most attention among recipients.
Technological progress rendered the issue of market failure partly obsolete
once it became possible to exclude potential free riders using digital rights manage-
ment or scrambled signals. Digitization also has increased the available supply
and freed the medium from the limits of linearity. However, even in the digital
media industry of the twenty-first century, public service media still exist because
in addition to the public good character, an even more powerful argument for
regulation lies in the merit good character of the media (Ward 2006). Media are
said to feature positive externalities in wide areas of society with social benefits
clearly exceeding private ones. Governments that identify a merit good with its
positive impact on society usually introduce measures that maximize the consump-
tion and supply of the desirable good or service, which is done by subsidies. In
the case of broadcasting, the instrument of choice is the introduction of public
service media; for newspapers and magazines, common measures include indirect
measures, such as a reduced sales tax, and direct measures, such as reduced distri-
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bution fees (Fernández Alonso et al. 2006: 2). In the audiovisual sector, almost
every developed country offers some form of subsidies in the shape of film funding
schemes.
Public service media in small countries gain an outstanding importance. Small
countries are characterized by small media markets and a shortage of resources.
As a consequence, there are special constraints for small states: dependence and
vulnerability (Trappel 1991; Meier and Trappel 1992; Siegert 2006b). Furthermore,
small states struggle at times to protect their cultural heritage when confronted
with the dominance of international content and content from larger neighboring
states. Therefore, regulation in small states tends to interfere more directly with
the content while allowing cross-media ownership for national champions (Puppis
2009). Also, public service media in small states are expected to support cultural
national identity.
Providing platforms for interpersonal communication usually also involves
dealing with regulation. Since network effects are deemed positive for society, reg-
ulators demand universal service for everybody and may set a low price for a basic
service in order to include every citizen in the communication network. Communi-
cation networks often have the character of a natural monopoly which makes regu-
lation even more necessary to prevent excessive tariffs (Meyer et al. 1980).
2.5 Business and revenue models
Business models connect media economics to media management by describing
underlying characteristics of the industry sector that enable commerce in the prod-
uct or service. Thus, media business models are not so much about daily business
activities, but a fundamental concept of how the business can operate, what inter-
faces it offers for other industries, and what trade relations and financial interac-
tions render it potentially successful. They can be described as structural design
of the relevant flows of information, services, and, finally, products, and include
an account of the necessary business activities and their reciprocal importance
(Picard 2002). A business model consists of several submodels: procurement; mar-
ket (demand, competition); goods and services; service offerings; distribution; and
capital (funding, revenue). Additionally, a business model should include a
description of the potential benefits of the various business actors and the sources
of revenue. This constitutes the revenue model, which addresses questions regard-
ing how revenue can be retrieved and from what sources, as well as what amount
is necessary to finance the ongoing operations.
Revenue models can be distinguished by direct and indirect sources of revenue
(Zerdick et al. 2000: 25) or by separating the relevant markets in which an organiza-
tion is engaged (Wirtz 2009: 78). These two typologies can be applied both to mass
communication and interpersonal communication platforms.
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In the first perspective, direct financing is most often obtained from the users,
while indirect financing can be derived from companies (advertising) or the state
(subsidies). The other perspective differentiates three markets where revenue can
be realized: content markets, audience/user markets, and advertising markets. On
content markets, media organizations trade licenses and exploitation rights, and
the ‘non-rivalrousness’ of media use creates secondary markets. A broadcaster can
sell the rights to a successful TV show to a different territory, or a publisher can
license the concept of a successful magazine to another country. In addition, servi-
ces and merchandise might be sold. It has nothing in common with interpersonal
communication since usually it consists of inputs from two partners who will not
bill each other for the words spoken during a conversation. From an economic
perspective, issues of interpersonal communication mostly concern how to provide
a platform where the communication takes place and then gain profit from operat-
ing that platform. Platforms for interpersonal communication do not need to be
based on a technological network, but can be a coffee house where people meet
for a hot drink and a chat. Overall, if we neglect the content market, interpersonal
and mass communication have the same business models on the user and advertis-
ing markets. According to the concept of two-sided markets (Rochet and Tirole
2006), both markets are interdependent and connected via the price mechanism.
Changes in price on the audience/user market influence the demand on the adver-
tising market, and vice versa.
When looking at mass communication advertising markets, different advertis-
ing formats with associated recipient attention or recipient information can be
sold. New means of interpersonal communication such as email services, chat
rooms, and social networks on the Internet employ the same funding scheme as
most mass media: selling attention to advertisers and selling consumer profiles to
marketers. However, the quality of contact might be better than in mass media,
and targeting of advertisements can be improved as social media networks struggle
to capitalize on the attention of users.3 In the context of interpersonal communica-
tion, advertising might be considered even more intrusive when used as part of
mass media content. We see the same tendencies toward ad avoidance on the
consumer side, as well as the blending of content and advertising on the side of
the platform providers and advertisers.
However, advertising does not constitute the only opportunity to bundle com-
munication with another product or service to realize an indirect means of funding.
3 Recently, a new form of predominantly interpersonal communication (social online networks)
has changed marketing since they enable corporations to establish quasi-interpersonal communi-
cations with potential consumers. In a social media network, the concept of a brand personality
(Aaker 1997) is enlivened because it becomes possible to make friends with a brand and interact
and communicate with it as if it were a real person (Burns 2010). In the course, brand communi-
cation becomes part of other interpersonal communications, for instance, when individuals pass
on funny clips from a viral marketing campaign (Bauer et al. 2008).
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In the coffee house example mentioned earlier, the platform for interpersonal com-
munication is funded by the price of a cup of coffee. Another example would be
the price of Internet access that includes a personal email address. Because the
platform is funded indirectly, though, providers have to make sure that the unpaid
part of the bundle is not over used. Thus, Internet service providers introduce
email quotas, and the coffee house’s host might ask a lingering patron to either
order another drink or leave, opening up the table for a new paying customer.
A network or platform operator who enables interpersonal communication can
exclude potential users, and thus is able to charge whenever the network is used.
This can be based on time or distance, e.g., when a telephone provider charges by
the minute or a postal service sets different prices for letters to foreign countries
depending on the distance required for delivery. As with newspapers, single pay-
ments can be replaced by subscriptions. Telephone providers in most countries
now offer flat rates that allow users to use the network more or less without limits.
Subscription models require that the average usage time results in costs below the
net costs. Flat fees are a means to improve the capacity utilization if network costs
are fixed. The same is true in the context of mass communication. Recipients can
be charged for access to media or for media use. Again, there are subscription
models that make the cash flow more predictable and also single payments for
items in high demand that can seek a premium due to a willingness to pay. How-
ever, the merit good character of some media implies that the totaled individual
willingness to pay cannot cover the production costs. Since the public has an
interest in these media offerings, the state is an important fourth source of revenue
or cost reduction. The media is considered important and influential for the politi-
cal and cultural development and cohesion of a society, so in many countries the
state supports the media by introducing a license fee to finance a public broad-
caster (e.g., UK) or financing it directly through tax money (e.g., Spain). Most coun-
tries have reduced tax rates for media products and often the distribution is spon-
sored through subsidized postal fees. Film producers often enjoy tax breaks or
even receive substantial direct financial contributions.
While interpersonal communication is predominantly financed directly
through transmission charges, most media companies use mixed financing to
spread risks while avoiding dependencies. The respective contribution of each reve-
nue source depends on good characteristics as well as competition (Kind et al.
2009).
2.6 Added value and value chain
The concept of added value is derived from macroeconomic accounting where it is
used to measure the contribution of an industry to the GDP. To analyze the per-
formance of the media as an industry sector, market boundaries must be defined
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(see Section 2.2) and relations to other sectors up- and downstream need to be
clarified. We can speak of a division of labor on an industry level, which in microe-
conomics can be described as value chain. The concept was introduced to business
management by Porter (1985) as a succession of discrete activities for a firm operat-
ing in a specific industry. The products are taken through each of these activities
and gain value every time they conclude a step. The chain of activities lends more
added value to the product than the sum of added values of all activities.
The value chain can be used as a means to define markets – all firms on the
same level compete with each other. It can also be used to conceptualize business
models since it defines the interfaces between different steps in development from
idea to reception. Typically the value chain for the media industry cannot use
the element of the original concept with inbound logistics, operations, outbound
logistics, marketing and sales, and service accompanied by overarching support
activities such as infrastructure, human resources, technology, and procurement.
With predominantly intangible input factors and output terms of classic inventory
management become murky. Furthermore, the duality of the media as content and
advertising vehicle complicates the structure (Wirtz 2009).
Fig. 1: Generic value chain in the media industry
There used to be distinct value chains for different media technologies with little,
if any, overlapping between them. Changes in the technology and in the way the
industry is organized have blurred the boundaries between technology-specific
value chains and created a more generic multimedia value chain (see Fig. 1). Tech-
nological progress allows for disintermediation, or the systematic canceling of cer-
tain steps in the value chain. For example, electronic media such as radio and
television do not have to be printed and copied, but can be directly distributed.
Musicians who sell their recordings directly via the Internet skip procurement and
integrate production, and if they use their own web site instead of platforms such
as iTunes, they can even leap the packaging step. Convergence (see Section 3.2)
has made this research perspective more complicated and less easily applicable.
2.7 Network effects and network externalities
Media content is often produced in networks by combining the expertise of differ-
ent media workers. It is distributed using transmission networks and consumed by
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recipients who use media content as conversation subjects in their social networks.
Thus, networks matter in media economics. Network goods differ from other goods
concerning the value creation because of network externalities; consumers decid-
ing between substitutable goods consider how their decision will affect others and
how the decision of others will affect them. The utility that a user derives from the
consumption of a network good increases with the number of others consuming
the good (Katz and Shapiro 1985).
Generally, we can differentiate between direct and indirect network effects. In
the first case, consumption externalities result from a direct physical effect of the
number of purchasers on the product quality. A classic example would be a tele-
phone network where the utility that a consumer derives from joining the network
by buying access from the operator depends directly on the number of others who
have already joined the network. Indirect network effects do not require a physical
connection. When more consumers buy a certain kind of hardware, it increases
the likelihood that a wide variety of different kinds of compatible software will be
available for it. This phenomenon can be observed each time different standards
for a new medium compete for user acceptance. For example, when consumers
decide between HD-DVD or Blu-ray player disc technology, their individual deci-
sions make one format more attractive than the other, since the home entertain-
ment industry is likely to offer more movies in the more widely adopted format.
The utility of a product increases with the greater availability of compatible com-
plementary products.
For media content, an externality lies in the consumer capital for discussing
common experiences when recipients have shared the experience of a certain con-
tent. But the case in point of network effects is the dual-product marketplace of
traditional media (see Section 2.3). For users, network effects can lead to a lock-in
due to high switching cost. For instance, a fan of a certain daily soap opera benefits
from the fact that a large number of viewers watch the same show, and thus they
have a common conversation topic. So this viewer might hesitate to switch to a
competing soap airing at the same time because in addition to learning new char-
acters and plotlines, s/he would not be able to talk about the new experience with
those still watching the first show. Therefore, media companies can use network
effects to tie the customers to their products.
However, network effects wear out as a network enlarges (Leibenstein 1950).
The marginal benefit of one new user is much higher in a small network than in
a big one. With the penetration of a phone network at almost 100%, the value of
that phone network does not further increase with a new installation.
Externalities result in economies of scale on the demand side. Larger compa-
nies with larger networks benefit more from externalities, thus their existence is a
strong driver of concentration (see Section 3.1). This most often leads to natural
monopolies in the case of broadcasting and telecommunication infrastructure (Pos-
ner 1969) since new entrants to the market cannot compete with the incumbent
operator in terms of cost advantages and utility for users.
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3 Fundamental developments in media systems
3.1 Media concentration
Media goods feature several traits that make consolidation and concentration
attractive. Since media content is unique, the costs of development are high. Con-
sumers constantly demand novelty and their interests often are hard to predict, so
production is risky. This means that being big is attractive in the industry. Econo-
mies of scale and scope lead to higher efficiency in larger companies. The advan-
tage of size rests in the possible offset of risk and in the maximization of exploita-
tion of content rights, especially in unit cost savings when first copy costs can be
distributed over more copies. Furthermore, size brings about important advantages
such as negotiation power with advertisers and improved access to capital. The
latter proves important when new markets open up. Since the 1980s, only large
companies have had the financial strength to enter the new broadcasting and tele-
communication markets introduced when media policy ended a public service
monopoly in much of the developed world (Picard 1998).
However, what is considered good from an entrepreneurial perspective might
not be in the best interest of the society as a whole. Media concentration is
regarded as a possible threat to diversity of ideas, tastes, and opinions. On the
contrary, media diversity and media pluralism are considered prerequisites for
effective freedom of expression and information (Meier and Trappel 1998). Even if
we only consider economic aspects, though, concentration is not in the best inter-
est of consumers. When the level of concentration reduces competition, it leads to
higher prices, fewer choices, and poorer service for consumers. Concentration gives
dominant firms control over resources that can be used against smaller firms in a
competitive marketplace.
Concentration is not a new phenomenon. During the 1950s and 1960s, a con-
solidation of newspapers in several western European countries triggered extensive
research (Aufermann and Heilmann 1970), but the deregulation of the audiovisual
sector in Europe since the 1980s has pronounced the issue. Publishers expanded
their operations to the TV sector, and thus claimed a bigger share of the media
and opinion market as a whole. The professionalization of advertising and the
emergence of huge international advertising networks serving brands that expand
internationally have increased the pressure among media firms to grow and build
market power.
We need to distinguish between different aspects of what is called media con-
centration:
– Horizontal concentration or mono-media concentration (Meier and Trappel
1998) looks at distinct media markets separated by geography or the means
of distribution, e.g., the development of the market shares of British national
newspapers. From an economic perspective, only horizontal concentration
actually describes a concentration.
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– Vertical integration considers the effect of mergers and acquisitions on the con-
centration of power of one corporation across the value chain (see Section 2.6). If
a TV network buys a big production company, this increases concentration nei-
ther in the broadcasting market nor in the production market. However, it
increases the market power of that corporation and transforms a transparent
exchange relationship on the market into internal affairs of that corporation.
– Cross-media or multimedia concentration (Sánchez-Tabernero 1993: 16) consid-
ers the media market as a whole where mergers and acquisitions among differ-
ent media technologies (e.g., newspapers and broadcasters) not only create syn-
ergies but also increase market power in the overall ‘market’ of public opinion.
– Conglomerate concentration may occur when surplus capital from one industry
seeks new business opportunities, or when new markets that open require con-
siderable investment. The latter was the case when broadcasting was deregu-
lated in France and Italy and commercial broadcasters were financed by banks
or construction companies. For conglomerate concentration, different misgiv-
ings emerge. While the level of competition within the media market might not
be reduced, chances are that the conglomerate tries to use its media ownership
to influence the media content in its own best interest.
For cross-media concentration, the question arises: to what extent are the markets
actually separated? Consumers as well as advertisers might use different media as
substitutes so that they form a common relevant market. Thus, the concentration
of ownership does not always imply less diversity in content. When two newspa-
pers in the same region merge, it is likely that the content of the merged newspaper
is less diverse. However, if a newspaper from another region, or if the dominant
national TV chain buys a regional newspaper, neither the size of the staff nor the
diversity of the content in that market have to change.
In markets for communication infrastructure, there is a tendency toward a
natural monopoly. The high costs of setting up a cable infrastructure or of running
a satellite distribution system prohibit the building of two competing networks.
While there usually is competition between different distribution channels, each
channel is run by a regional monopolist. In this context, it is evident that techno-
logical progress can at times reduce the potentially harmful effect of concentration.
The development of digital subscriber line (DSL) technology enabled telephone
operators to compete with cable operators, not only in the new field of data traffic,
but also in the market for TV distribution. The Internet has vastly expanded the
news sources available to recipients. Citizens living in a region with a monopolist
newspaper can read newspapers from other regions online or access firsthand
information from other sources within their region. Technology leads to fragmenta-
tion, so owning several media outlets does not necessarily lead to concentration,
but can be regarded as a means to retain market share. Depending on the market
in question, concentration is not always on the rise.
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Media concentration policy tries to control the potentially harmful effects of
media concentration. Policy instruments differ widely between different countries;
however, some measures seem to be prevalent. Either the number of media outlets
or the market share that may be controlled by a single company is limited. Often
cross-media ownership also is limited, meaning that a dominant player in one
media technology may not expand into another to keep competition between the
two genres alive.
However, studies about the effect of media concentration policy in general,
and press concentration in particular, suggest that the measures are not effective.
In some cases, there are even unintended outcomes ultimately favoring big inte-
grated media corporations (Tunstall 1996; Knoche 1997).
3.2 Convergence
Changing technological standards challenge the body of acquired knowledge con-
cerning media markets, value chains, and media business models. They provide
the bases for variation and innovation on different levels – mostly analyzed by
using the convergence concept. The concept of media convergence has multiple
meanings and includes various changes in media’s environments and behavior.
Across the literature (e.g., overview by Wirth 2006; articles in IJMM 2003, No. 1 or
the journal Convergence), convergence is seen as a multidimensional process that
comprehends:
– Technological convergence (e.g., innovation, digitization, standardization)
– Economic convergence (e.g., merging of formerly divided markets, reconfigu-
ration of value chains)
– Social convergence/convergence in media usage (e.g., consumer preferences
and behavior)
– Cultural convergence (e.g., cross-media storytelling and mutual interrelated
content)
– Policy convergence (e.g., deregulation, liberalization, convergence of formerly
separate regulatory bodies and models)
– Global convergence (e.g., internationalization of strategies and content)
Additionally, the various dimensions should not be regarded as isolated, but rather
as co-evolutionary developments (Latzer 1997). Some authors doubted whether
consumer preferences and behavior would change (Stipp 1999; Höflich 1999). How-
ever, recent research results show that the use of online content increases and
affects the use of traditional media and the definition of media markets (Gerhards
and Klingler 2007; de Waal et al. 2005; Cole 2004; van Eimeren and Frees 2009).
From the perspective of media companies, convergence appears as reconfigura-
tion of value chains and, following Wirth (2006), searching for synergy, increasing
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mergers and acquisition activities, and repurposing content on new media plat-
forms. As discussed, value chains of the telecommunication industry, IT industry,
and media industry merge into a convergent value chain. Telecom, IT, and media
companies develop new business segments and pursue cross-media strategies.
They increasingly operate in a common convergent market and have to face new
competitors with different backgrounds, as shown in Fig. 2.
Fig. 2: Convergent value chains and markets
The rise of the Internet in particular has affected the business model of traditional
media companies and gave a boost to free content. Although the demand for free
content is high, the revenue model unfortunately does not pay off for media com-
panies. Against the background of the last two economic crises (2000/2001: the
burst of the so-called dotcom bubble, and 2008/2009: the worldwide financial
crisis) media companies continuously complained about their role as producers of
high-quality journalism without receiving adequate funding. While traditional
media companies have to pay for the immense costs of good media coverage, Apple
and Google realize profits with ad search and online advertising.
3.3 Internationalization
In recent decades, the media industry has evolved from clearly separated markets,
in which family-owned businesses arranged themselves in a setting of low competi-
tion, to an international industry (Smith 1991; Demers 2002). Bertelsmann, for
instance, was founded in 1835 as a publisher in North Rhine-Westphalia and now
has about 500 newspaper and magazine titles in 30 countries, holds TV and radio
stations in ten European countries, and produces TV content in 22 countries and
licenses content in 150 countries.
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Internationalization is driven by two factors. First, media companies have an
interest in expanding across borders; second, media recipients have a certain inter-
est in foreign content (Sánchez-Tabernero 2006). Saturated national markets and
barriers to cross-ownership force growing media companies to enter foreign mar-
kets. Generally, there are three strategies to enter a foreign market (Hafstrand
1995). The simplest way is to export ready-made media products. While this
requires only small investments to achieve economies of scale, it is only feasible
when the market entered is nearby and similar in culture and demand structure.
This way of internationalization is common between neighboring countries sharing
the same language, e.g., French media in Belgium, or German media in Austria
and Switzerland. Another option is foreign direct investment, either in the form of
joint ventures, mergers and acquisitions, or greenfield, i.e., starting a new opera-
tion from scratch (Gershon 2000). Foreign direct investment provides a high degree
of control but requires a similarly high level of resources and commitment. The
strong cultural component of the media industry renders a greenfield strategy less
attractive since it does not allow building from knowledge of the new market. The
third strategy is licensing where a firm in the host country is permitted to use
a (intangible) property of the licensor such as trademarks, patents, production
techniques, or content templates. Licensing requires very little investment, but it
does not allow for generating revenue from production and marketing in the host
country. Even more important, licensing includes a transfer of know-how that also
might be utilized beyond the licensed product, and thus could strengthen possible
competitors.
Apart from the upsides in terms of economies of scale and scope and new growth
opportunities, internationalization also poses some problems for media companies.
Media content is highly dependent on the cultural context. For instance, only a frac-
tion of news content can be reused in other markets since most news broadcasts are
relevant only in a certain market and recipients, as well as advertisers, are interested
in local, regional or national content (Reid et al. 2005; Aldridge 2003). Entertainment
content generally travels more easily, although cultural and linguistic borders exist
aswell. Supported by powerful global distribution andmarketing, Hollywoodmovies
are quite successful in foreign markets, and the very basic storylines of Latin Ameri-
can telenovelas make them universally deployable.
Nevertheless, there is a cultural discount for media content. Since media con-
tent distributed in a foreign market does not completely address the cultural frame-
work, it will most likely draw a smaller audience, and thus be less valuable
(McFadyen et al. 2000). Non-fiction programming is harder to transfer from one
market to another due to its reliance on personalities (show host, celebrity guests,
etc.). In this case, the strategy of choice is licensing, rather than exporting content.
The emergence of an international trade in TV formats is a visible outcome of this
relationship (Moran and Malbon 2006; Altmeppen et al. 2007). Instead of exporting
complete shows, trade takes place via show templates that define game concept,
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the actor setting, and the dramaturgy. A format proven successful in one market
offers reduced risk and required time to market in other markets while allowing
for adjustments of the concept to local customs. This phenomenon is not limited
to TV formats such as ‘Who wants to be a Millionaire?’ (Freedman 2001), but also
happens with print magazines (Hafstrand 1995).
The other driving factor of internationalization is found in the recipients’ inter-
ests. Cairncross (1997) diagnosed a “death of distance” where space is no longer
the determining factor for social, information, and commercial relationships. Dis-
tance has become relative and this means the audience market becomes segmented
by interests rather than by geographic factors. The “long tail” (Anderson 2006) for
cultural goods can only work in a much expanded marketplace. Audience demand
that was too obscure in the traditional media market becomes a viable market
niche when search engines and recommendation systems allow recipients to find
products outside of their geographic area. Of course, cultural and linguistic bound-
aries still remain, but with reduced cost for logistics, especially for digital products,
exporting media content at a global scale is feasible even for specialized content.
4 Outlook
The fundamental importance of communication in modern societies is attended by
the public interest in the economic bases of communication and the respective
industry. Due to the various characteristics of interpersonal and mass communica-
tion, neither markets nor business models work as they do in other industries. The
economics and management of media and communication are affected by the pub-
lic and merit good character; the experience and credence good character of media
content, externalities, and network effects; and economies of scale and scope. Fur-
thermore, concentration, convergence, and internationalization tendencies not
only challenge the media industry but the respective research and literature. It is
an ongoing discussion whether the combination of characteristics makes it impos-
sible for a commercial media system to serve the public interest, or whether there
is a way to link quality and profit.
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